X-Git-Url: https://gitweb.michael.orlitzky.com/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fapply-default-acl.c;h=de4e1acc3b7b7cd10654ac4e389814d0786c6d89;hb=a7187b9c820583d75581c6fe7e26e38ed9e24f7e;hp=7058e6263d99f2493772f04733bb9b8eebe11d81;hpb=c8b0a4c1f78da7a966a3c8f7806631b0da1eea55;p=apply-default-acl.git diff --git a/src/apply-default-acl.c b/src/apply-default-acl.c index 7058e62..de4e1ac 100644 --- a/src/apply-default-acl.c +++ b/src/apply-default-acl.c @@ -13,8 +13,7 @@ #include /* AT_FOO constants */ #include /* nftw() et al. */ #include -#include /* dirname() */ -#include /* PATH_MAX */ +#include /* basename(), dirname() */ #include #include #include @@ -36,22 +35,23 @@ /** - * @brief Get the mode bits from the given path. + * @brief Get the mode bits from the given file descriptor. * - * @param path - * The path (file or directory) whose mode we want. + * @param fd + * The file descriptor (which may reference a directory) whose + * mode we want. * * @return A mode_t (st_mode) structure containing the mode bits. * See sys/stat.h for details. */ -mode_t get_mode(const char* path) { - if (path == NULL) { +mode_t get_mode(int fd) { + if (fd <= 0) { errno = ENOENT; - return -1; + return ACL_ERROR; } struct stat s; - int result = lstat(path, &s); + int result = fstat(fd, &s); if (result == 0) { return s.st_mode; @@ -65,21 +65,22 @@ mode_t get_mode(const char* path) { /** - * @brief Determine if the given path might refer to an (unsafe) hard link. + * @brief Determine if the given file descriptor might refer to an + * (unsafe) hard link. * - * @param path - * The path to test. + * @param fd + * The file descriptor whose link count we want to investigate. * - * @return true if we are certain that @c path does not refer to a hard + * @return true if we are certain that @c fd does not describe a hard * link, and false otherwise. In case of error, false is returned, - * because we are not sure that @c path is not a hard link. + * because we are not sure that @c fd is not a hard link. */ -bool is_hardlink_safe(const char* path) { - if (path == NULL) { +bool is_hardlink_safe(int fd) { + if (fd <= 0) { return false; } struct stat s; - int result = lstat(path, &s); + int result = fstat(fd, &s); if (result == 0) { return (s.st_nlink == 1 || S_ISDIR(s.st_mode)); } @@ -90,20 +91,21 @@ bool is_hardlink_safe(const char* path) { /** - * @brief Determine whether or not the given path is a regular file. + * @brief Determine whether or not the given file descriptor is for + * a regular file. * - * @param path - * The path to test. + * @param fd + * The file descriptor to test for regular-fileness. * - * @return true if @c path is a regular file, false otherwise. + * @return true if @c fd describes a regular file, and false otherwise. */ -bool is_regular_file(const char* path) { - if (path == NULL) { +bool is_regular_file(int fd) { + if (fd <= 0) { return false; } struct stat s; - int result = lstat(path, &s); + int result = fstat(fd, &s); if (result == 0) { return S_ISREG(s.st_mode); } @@ -158,7 +160,7 @@ bool path_accessible(const char* path) { * * @return true if @c path is a directory, false otherwise. */ -bool is_directory(const char* path) { +bool is_path_directory(const char* path) { if (path == NULL) { return false; } @@ -174,6 +176,31 @@ bool is_directory(const char* path) { } +/** + * @brief Determine whether or not the given file descriptor is for + * a directory. + * + * @param fd + * The file descriptor whose directoryness is in question. + * + * @return true if @c fd describes a directory, and false otherwise. + */ +bool is_directory(int fd) { + if (fd <= 0) { + return false; + } + + struct stat s; + int result = fstat(fd, &s); + if (result == 0) { + return S_ISDIR(s.st_mode); + } + else { + return false; + } +} + + /** * @brief Update (or create) an entry in an @b minimal ACL. @@ -433,35 +460,35 @@ int acl_execute_masked(acl_t acl) { /** - * @brief Determine whether @c path is executable (by anyone) or a + * @brief Determine whether @c fd is executable (by anyone) or a * directory. * * This is used as part of the heuristic to determine whether or not - * we should mask the execute bit when inheriting an ACL. If @c path - * is a directory, the answer is a clear-cut yes. This behavior is - * modeled after the capital 'X' perms of setfacl. + * we should mask the execute bit when inheriting an ACL. If @c fd + * describes a directory, the answer is a clear-cut yes. This behavior + * is modeled after the capital 'X' perms of setfacl. * - * If @c path is a file, we check the @a effective permissions, + * If @c fd describes a file, we check the @a effective permissions, * contrary to what setfacl does. * - * @param path - * The path to check. + * @param fd + * The file descriptor to check. * * @return - * - @c ACL_SUCCESS - @c path is a directory, or someone has effective + * - @c ACL_SUCCESS - @c fd describes a directory, or someone has effective execute permissions. - * - @c ACL_FAILURE - @c path is a regular file and nobody can execute + * - @c ACL_FAILURE - @c fd describes a regular file and nobody can execute it. * - @c ACL_ERROR - Unexpected library error. */ -int any_can_execute_or_dir(const char* path) { +int any_can_execute_or_dir(int fd) { - if (is_directory(path)) { + if (is_directory(fd)) { /* That was easy... */ return ACL_SUCCESS; } - acl_t acl = acl_get_file(path, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); + acl_t acl = acl_get_fd(fd); if (acl == (acl_t)NULL) { perror("any_can_execute_or_dir (acl_get_file)"); @@ -472,7 +499,7 @@ int any_can_execute_or_dir(const char* path) { int result = ACL_FAILURE; if (acl_is_minimal(acl)) { - mode_t mode = get_mode(path); + mode_t mode = get_mode(fd); if (mode & (S_IXUSR | S_IXOTH | S_IXGRP)) { result = ACL_SUCCESS; goto cleanup; @@ -569,7 +596,7 @@ int assign_default_acl(const char* path, acl_t acl) { return ACL_ERROR; } - if (!is_directory(path)) { + if (!is_path_directory(path)) { return ACL_FAILURE; } @@ -578,13 +605,13 @@ int assign_default_acl(const char* path, acl_t acl) { acl_t path_acl = acl_dup(acl); if (path_acl == (acl_t)NULL) { - perror("inherit_default_acl (acl_dup)"); + perror("assign_default_acl (acl_dup)"); return ACL_ERROR; /* Nothing to clean up in this case. */ } int sf_result = acl_set_file(path, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT, path_acl); - if (sf_result == -1) { - perror("inherit_default_acl (acl_set_file)"); + if (sf_result == ACL_ERROR) { + perror("assign_default_acl (acl_set_file)"); result = ACL_ERROR; } @@ -595,65 +622,34 @@ int assign_default_acl(const char* path, acl_t acl) { /** - * @brief Remove @c ACL_USER, @c ACL_GROUP, and @c ACL_MASK entries - * from the given path. + * @brief Remove all @c ACL_TYPE_ACCESS entries from the given file + * descriptor, leaving the UNIX permission bits. * - * @param path - * The path whose ACLs we want to wipe. + * @param fd + * The file descriptor whose ACLs we want to wipe. * * @return * - @c ACL_SUCCESS - The ACLs were wiped successfully, or none * existed in the first place. * - @c ACL_ERROR - Unexpected library error. */ -int wipe_acls(const char* path) { +int wipe_acls(int fd) { + /* Initialize an empty ACL, and then overwrite the one on "fd" with it. */ + acl_t empty_acl = acl_init(0); - if (path == NULL) { - errno = ENOENT; + if (empty_acl == (acl_t)NULL) { + perror("wipe_acls (acl_init)"); return ACL_ERROR; } - acl_t acl = acl_get_file(path, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); - if (acl == (acl_t)NULL) { - perror("wipe_acls (acl_get_file)"); + if (acl_set_fd(fd, empty_acl) == ACL_ERROR) { + perror("wipe_acls (acl_set_fd)"); + acl_free(empty_acl); return ACL_ERROR; } - /* Our return value. */ - int result = ACL_SUCCESS; - - acl_entry_t entry; - int ge_result = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_FIRST_ENTRY, &entry); - - while (ge_result == ACL_SUCCESS) { - int d_result = acl_delete_entry(acl, entry); - if (d_result == ACL_ERROR) { - perror("wipe_acls (acl_delete_entry)"); - result = ACL_ERROR; - goto cleanup; - } - - ge_result = acl_get_entry(acl, ACL_NEXT_ENTRY, &entry); - } - - /* Catches the first acl_get_entry as well as the ones at the end of - the loop. */ - if (ge_result == ACL_ERROR) { - perror("wipe_acls (acl_get_entry)"); - result = ACL_ERROR; - goto cleanup; - } - - int sf_result = acl_set_file(path, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, acl); - if (sf_result == ACL_ERROR) { - perror("wipe_acls (acl_set_file)"); - result = ACL_ERROR; - goto cleanup; - } - - cleanup: - acl_free(acl); - return result; + acl_free(empty_acl); + return ACL_SUCCESS; } @@ -682,45 +678,59 @@ int apply_default_acl(const char* path, bool no_exec_mask) { return ACL_ERROR; } - /* Refuse to operate on hard links, which can be abused by an - * attacker to trick us into changing the ACL on a file we didn't - * intend to; namely the "target" of the hard link. To truly prevent - * that sort of mischief, we should be using file descriptors for - * the target and its parent directory. Then modulo a tiny race - * condition, we would be sure that "path" and "parent" don't change - * their nature between the time that we test them and when we - * utilize them. For contrast, the same attacker is free to replace - * "path" with a hard link after is_hardlink_safe() has returned - * "true" below. - * - * Unfortunately, our API is lacking in this area. For example, - * acl_set_fd() is only capable of setting the ACL_TYPE_ACCESS list, - * and not the ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT. Apparently the only way to operate - * on default ACLs is through the path name, which is inherently - * unreliable since the acl_*_file() calls themselves might follow - * links (both hard and symbolic). - * - * Some improvement could still be made by using descriptors where - * possible -- this would shrink the exploit window -- but for now - * we use a naive implementation that only keeps honest men honest. - */ - if (!is_hardlink_safe(path)) { - return ACL_FAILURE; + /* Define these next three variables here because we may have to + * jump to the cleanup routine which expects them to exist. + */ + + /* Our return value. */ + int result = ACL_SUCCESS; + + /* The default ACL on path's parent directory */ + acl_t defacl = (acl_t)NULL; + + /* The file descriptor corresponding to "path" */ + int fd = 0; + + /* Split "path" into base/dirname parts to be used with openat(). + * We duplicate the strings involved because dirname/basename mangle + * their arguments. + */ + char* path_copy = strdup(path); + if (path_copy == NULL) { + perror("apply_default_acl (strdup)"); + return ACL_ERROR; } + char* parent = dirname(path_copy); - if (!is_regular_file(path) && !is_directory(path)) { - return ACL_FAILURE; + fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW); + if (fd == -1) { + if (errno == ELOOP) { + result = ACL_FAILURE; /* hit a symlink */ + goto cleanup; + } + else { + perror("apply_default_acl (open fd)"); + result = ACL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; + } } - /* dirname mangles its argument */ - char path_copy[PATH_MAX]; - strncpy(path_copy, path, PATH_MAX-1); - path_copy[PATH_MAX-1] = 0; - char* parent = dirname(path_copy); - if (!is_directory(parent)) { - /* Make sure dirname() did what we think it did. */ - return ACL_FAILURE; + /* Refuse to operate on hard links, which can be abused by an + * attacker to trick us into changing the ACL on a file we didn't + * intend to; namely the "target" of the hard link. There is TOCTOU + * race condition here, but the window is as small as possible + * between when we open the file descriptor (look above) and when we + * fstat it. + */ + if (!is_hardlink_safe(fd)) { + result = ACL_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; + } + + if (!is_regular_file(fd) && !is_directory(fd)) { + result = ACL_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; } /* Default to not masking the exec bit; i.e. applying the default @@ -729,27 +739,26 @@ int apply_default_acl(const char* path, bool no_exec_mask) { bool allow_exec = true; if (!no_exec_mask) { - int ace_result = any_can_execute_or_dir(path); + int ace_result = any_can_execute_or_dir(fd); if (ace_result == ACL_ERROR) { perror("apply_default_acl (any_can_execute_or_dir)"); - return ACL_ERROR; + result = ACL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; } allow_exec = (bool)ace_result; } - acl_t defacl = acl_get_file(parent, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); + defacl = acl_get_file(parent, ACL_TYPE_DEFAULT); if (defacl == (acl_t)NULL) { perror("apply_default_acl (acl_get_file)"); - return ACL_ERROR; + result = ACL_ERROR; + goto cleanup; } - /* Our return value. */ - int result = ACL_SUCCESS; - - int wipe_result = wipe_acls(path); + int wipe_result = wipe_acls(fd); if (wipe_result == ACL_ERROR) { perror("apply_default_acl (wipe_acls)"); result = ACL_ERROR; @@ -758,9 +767,9 @@ int apply_default_acl(const char* path, bool no_exec_mask) { /* Do this after wipe_acls(), otherwise we'll overwrite the wiped ACL with this one. */ - acl_t acl = acl_get_file(path, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS); + acl_t acl = acl_get_fd(fd); if (acl == (acl_t)NULL) { - perror("apply_default_acl (acl_get_file)"); + perror("apply_default_acl (acl_get_fd)"); result = ACL_ERROR; goto cleanup; } @@ -768,7 +777,7 @@ int apply_default_acl(const char* path, bool no_exec_mask) { /* If it's a directory, inherit the parent's default. */ int inherit_result = assign_default_acl(path, defacl); if (inherit_result == ACL_ERROR) { - perror("apply_default_acl (inherit_acls)"); + perror("apply_default_acl (assign_default_acl)"); result = ACL_ERROR; goto cleanup; } @@ -856,15 +865,22 @@ int apply_default_acl(const char* path, bool no_exec_mask) { goto cleanup; } - int sf_result = acl_set_file(path, ACL_TYPE_ACCESS, acl); + int sf_result = acl_set_fd(fd, acl); if (sf_result == ACL_ERROR) { - perror("apply_default_acl (acl_set_file)"); + perror("apply_default_acl (acl_set_fd)"); result = ACL_ERROR; goto cleanup; } cleanup: - acl_free(defacl); + free(path_copy); + if (defacl != (acl_t)NULL) { + acl_free(defacl); + } + if (fd >= 0 && close(fd) == -1) { + perror("apply_default_acl (close)"); + result = ACL_ERROR; + } return result; } @@ -967,7 +983,7 @@ int apply_default_acl_nftw_x(const char *target, */ bool apply_default_acl_recursive(const char *target, bool no_exec_mask) { - if (!is_directory(target)) { + if (!is_path_directory(target)) { return apply_default_acl(target, no_exec_mask); }