X-Git-Url: https://gitweb.michael.orlitzky.com/?a=blobdiff_plain;f=src%2Fapply-default-acl.c;h=3cf3060a115e2be50f75822d13319e5362684a82;hb=f0970d1193ebddbfcd2ba9523a0f956aed2bd4cc;hp=993b1f7649e14c50300174da1f5d87fcb534d20a;hpb=f22034c7b75b7096e6ef26de7a5bc8e12a3f0b07;p=apply-default-acl.git diff --git a/src/apply-default-acl.c b/src/apply-default-acl.c index 993b1f7..3cf3060 100644 --- a/src/apply-default-acl.c +++ b/src/apply-default-acl.c @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ #include /* nftw() et al. */ #include #include /* basename(), dirname() */ +#include /* PATH_MAX */ #include #include #include @@ -32,84 +33,144 @@ #define ACL_FAILURE 0 #define ACL_SUCCESS 1 +/* Even though most other library functions reliably return -1 for + * error, it feels a little wrong to re-use the ACL_ERROR constant. + */ +#define CLOSE_ERROR -1 +#define NFTW_ERROR -1 +#define OPEN_ERROR -1 +#define SNPRINTF_ERROR -1 +#define STAT_ERROR -1 /** - * @brief Get the mode bits from the given file descriptor. + * @brief The recursive portion of the @c safe_open function, used to + * open a file descriptor in a symlink-safe way when combined with + * the @c O_NOFOLLOW flag. * - * @param fd - * The file descriptor (which may reference a directory) whose - * mode we want. + * @param at_fd + * A file descriptor relative to which @c pathname will be opened. + * + * @param pathname + * The path to the file/directory/whatever whose descriptor you want. * - * @return A mode_t (st_mode) structure containing the mode bits. - * See sys/stat.h for details. + * @return a file descriptor for @c pathname if everything goes well, + * and @c OPEN_ERROR if not. */ -mode_t get_mode(int fd) { - if (fd <= 0) { - errno = ENOENT; - return ACL_ERROR; - } - - struct stat s; - int result = fstat(fd, &s); - - if (result == 0) { - return s.st_mode; - } - else { - /* errno will be set already by lstat() */ - return result; - } +int safe_open_ex(int at_fd, char* pathname, int flags) { + if (pathname != NULL && strlen(pathname) == 0) { + /* Oops, went one level to deep with nothing to do. */ + return at_fd; + } + + char* firstslash = strchr(pathname, '/'); + if (firstslash == NULL) { + /* No more slashes, this is the base case. */ + int r = openat(at_fd, pathname, flags); + return r; + } + + /* Temporarily disable the slash, so that the subsequent call to + openat() opens only the next directory (and doesn't recurse). */ + *firstslash = '\0'; + int fd = safe_open_ex(at_fd, pathname, flags); + if (fd == OPEN_ERROR) { + if (errno != ELOOP) { + /* Don't output anything if we ignore a symlink */ + perror("safe_open_ex (safe_open_ex)"); + } + return OPEN_ERROR; + } + + /* The ++ is safe because there needs to be at least a null byte + after the first slash, even if it's the last real character in + the string. */ + int result = safe_open_ex(fd, firstslash+1, flags); + if (close(fd) == CLOSE_ERROR) { + perror("safe_open_ex (close)"); + return OPEN_ERROR; + } + return result; } - /** - * @brief Determine if the given file descriptor might refer to an - * (unsafe) hard link. + * @brief A version of @c open that is completely symlink-safe when + * used with the @c O_NOFOLLOW flag. * - * @param fd - * The file descriptor whose link count we want to investigate. + * The @c openat function exists to ensure that you can anchor one + * path to a particular directory while opening it; however, if you + * open "b/c/d" relative to "/a", then even the @c openat function will + * still follow symlinks in the "b" component. This can be exploited + * by an attacker to make you open the wrong path. + * + * To avoid that problem, this function uses a recursive + * implementation that opens every path from the root, one level at a + * time. So "a" is opened relative to "/", and then "b" is opened + * relative to "/a", and then "c" is opened relative to "/a/b", + * etc. When the @c O_NOFOLLOW flag is used, this approach ensures + * that no symlinks in any component are followed. + * + * @param pathname + * The path to the file/directory/whatever whose descriptor you want. * - * @return true if we are certain that @c fd does not describe a hard - * link, and false otherwise. In case of error, false is returned, - * because we are not sure that @c fd is not a hard link. + * @return a file descriptor for @c pathname if everything goes well, + * and @c OPEN_ERROR if not. */ -bool is_hardlink_safe(int fd) { - if (fd <= 0) { - return false; +int safe_open(const char* pathname, int flags) { + if (pathname == NULL || strlen(pathname) == 0 || pathname[0] == '\0') { + /* error? */ + return OPEN_ERROR; } - struct stat s; - if (fstat(fd, &s) == 0) { - return (s.st_nlink == 1 || S_ISDIR(s.st_mode)); + + char abspath[PATH_MAX]; + int snprintf_result = 0; + if (strchr(pathname, '/') == pathname) { + /* pathname is already absolute; just copy it. */ + snprintf_result = snprintf(abspath, PATH_MAX, "%s", pathname); } else { - return false; - } -} - + /* Concatenate the current working directory and pathname into an + * absolute path. We use realpath() ONLY on the cwd part, and not + * on the pathname part, because realpath() resolves symlinks. And + * the whole point of all this crap is to avoid following symlinks + * in the pathname. + * + * Using realpath() on the cwd lets us operate on relative paths + * while we're sitting in a directory that happens to have a + * symlink in it; for example: cd /var/run && apply-default-acl foo. + */ + char* cwd = get_current_dir_name(); + if (cwd == NULL) { + perror("safe_open (get_current_dir_name)"); + return OPEN_ERROR; + } -/** - * @brief Determine whether or not the given file descriptor is for - * a regular file. - * - * @param fd - * The file descriptor to test for regular-fileness. - * - * @return true if @c fd describes a regular file, and false otherwise. - */ -bool is_regular_file(int fd) { - if (fd <= 0) { - return false; + char abs_cwd[PATH_MAX]; + if (realpath(cwd, abs_cwd) == NULL) { + perror("safe_open (realpath)"); + free(cwd); + return OPEN_ERROR; + } + snprintf_result = snprintf(abspath, PATH_MAX, "%s/%s", abs_cwd, pathname); + free(cwd); + } + if (snprintf_result == SNPRINTF_ERROR || snprintf_result > PATH_MAX) { + perror("safe_open (snprintf)"); + return OPEN_ERROR; } - struct stat s; - if (fstat(fd, &s) == 0) { - return S_ISREG(s.st_mode); + int fd = open("/", flags); + if (strcmp(abspath, "/") == 0) { + return fd; } - else { - return false; + + int result = safe_open_ex(fd, abspath+1, flags); + if (close(fd) == CLOSE_ERROR) { + perror("safe_open (close)"); + return OPEN_ERROR; } + return result; } @@ -148,54 +209,6 @@ bool path_accessible(const char* path) { -/** - * @brief Determine whether or not the given path is a directory. - * - * @param path - * The path to test. - * - * @return true if @c path is a directory, false otherwise. - */ -bool is_path_directory(const char* path) { - if (path == NULL) { - return false; - } - - struct stat s; - if (lstat(path, &s) == 0) { - return S_ISDIR(s.st_mode); - } - else { - return false; - } -} - - -/** - * @brief Determine whether or not the given file descriptor is for - * a directory. - * - * @param fd - * The file descriptor whose directoryness is in question. - * - * @return true if @c fd describes a directory, and false otherwise. - */ -bool is_directory(int fd) { - if (fd <= 0) { - return false; - } - - struct stat s; - if (fstat(fd, &s) == 0) { - return S_ISDIR(s.st_mode); - } - else { - return false; - } -} - - - /** * @brief Update (or create) an entry in an @b minimal ACL. * @@ -220,8 +233,7 @@ bool is_directory(int fd) { * returned. Otherwise, @c ACL_SUCCESS. * */ -int acl_set_entry(acl_t* aclp, - acl_entry_t entry) { +int acl_set_entry(acl_t* aclp, acl_entry_t entry) { acl_tag_t entry_tag; if (acl_get_tag_type(entry, &entry_tag) == ACL_ERROR) { @@ -443,38 +455,30 @@ int acl_execute_masked(acl_t acl) { /** - * @brief Determine whether @c fd is executable (by anyone) or a - * directory. + * @brief Determine whether @c fd is executable by anyone. + * * * This is used as part of the heuristic to determine whether or not * we should mask the execute bit when inheriting an ACL. If @c fd - * describes a directory, the answer is a clear-cut yes. This behavior - * is modeled after the capital 'X' perms of setfacl. - * - * If @c fd describes a file, we check the @a effective permissions, - * contrary to what setfacl does. + * describes a file, we check the @a effective permissions, contrary + * to what setfacl does. * * @param fd * The file descriptor to check. * + * @param sp + * A pointer to a stat structure for @c fd. + * * @return - * - @c ACL_SUCCESS - @c fd describes a directory, or someone has effective - execute permissions. - * - @c ACL_FAILURE - @c fd describes a regular file and nobody can execute - it. + * - @c ACL_SUCCESS - Someone has effective execute permissions on @c fd. + * - @c ACL_FAILURE - Nobody can execute @c fd. * - @c ACL_ERROR - Unexpected library error. */ -int any_can_execute_or_dir(int fd) { - - if (is_directory(fd)) { - /* That was easy... */ - return ACL_SUCCESS; - } - +int any_can_execute(int fd, const struct stat* sp) { acl_t acl = acl_get_fd(fd); if (acl == (acl_t)NULL) { - perror("any_can_execute_or_dir (acl_get_file)"); + perror("any_can_execute (acl_get_file)"); return ACL_ERROR; } @@ -482,8 +486,7 @@ int any_can_execute_or_dir(int fd) { int result = ACL_FAILURE; if (acl_is_minimal(acl)) { - mode_t mode = get_mode(fd); - if (mode & (S_IXUSR | S_IXOTH | S_IXGRP)) { + if (sp->st_mode & (S_IXUSR | S_IXOTH | S_IXGRP)) { result = ACL_SUCCESS; goto cleanup; } @@ -502,7 +505,7 @@ int any_can_execute_or_dir(int fd) { acl_tag_t tag = ACL_UNDEFINED_TAG; if (acl_get_tag_type(entry, &tag) == ACL_ERROR) { - perror("any_can_execute_or_dir (acl_get_tag_type)"); + perror("any_can_execute_or (acl_get_tag_type)"); result = ACL_ERROR; goto cleanup; } @@ -516,14 +519,14 @@ int any_can_execute_or_dir(int fd) { acl_permset_t permset; if (acl_get_permset(entry, &permset) == ACL_ERROR) { - perror("any_can_execute_or_dir (acl_get_permset)"); + perror("any_can_execute_or (acl_get_permset)"); result = ACL_ERROR; goto cleanup; } int gp_result = acl_get_perm(permset, ACL_EXECUTE); if (gp_result == ACL_ERROR) { - perror("any_can_execute_or_dir (acl_get_perm)"); + perror("any_can_execute (acl_get_perm)"); result = ACL_ERROR; goto cleanup; } @@ -540,7 +543,7 @@ int any_can_execute_or_dir(int fd) { } if (ge_result == ACL_ERROR) { - perror("any_can_execute_or_dir (acl_get_entry)"); + perror("any_can_execute (acl_get_entry)"); result = ACL_ERROR; goto cleanup; } @@ -553,11 +556,10 @@ int any_can_execute_or_dir(int fd) { /** - * @brief Set @c acl as the default ACL on @c path if it's a directory. + * @brief Set @c acl as the default ACL on @c path. * - * This overwrites any existing default ACL on @c path. If no default - * ACL exists, then one is created. If @c path is not a directory, we - * return ACL_FAILURE but no error is raised. + * This overwrites any existing default ACL on @c path. If @c path is + * not a directory, we return ACL_ERROR and @c errno is set. * * @param path * The target directory whose ACL we wish to replace or create. @@ -567,21 +569,17 @@ int any_can_execute_or_dir(int fd) { * * @return * - @c ACL_SUCCESS - The default ACL was assigned successfully. - * - @c ACL_FAILURE - If @c path is not a directory. * - @c ACL_ERROR - Unexpected library error. */ int assign_default_acl(const char* path, acl_t acl) { if (path == NULL) { - errno = ENOENT; + errno = EINVAL; + perror("assign_default_acl (args)"); return ACL_ERROR; } - if (!is_path_directory(path)) { - return ACL_FAILURE; - } - - /* Our return value; success unless something bad happens. */ + /* Our return value; success unless something bad happens. */ int result = ACL_SUCCESS; acl_t path_acl = acl_dup(acl); @@ -642,6 +640,10 @@ int wipe_acls(int fd) { * @param path * The path whose ACL we would like to reset to its default. * + * @param sp + * A pointer to a stat structure for @c path, or @c NULL if you don't + * have one handy. + * * @param no_exec_mask * The value (either true or false) of the --no-exec-mask flag. * @@ -651,10 +653,13 @@ int wipe_acls(int fd) { * or the parent of @c path is not a directory. * - @c ACL_ERROR - Unexpected library error. */ -int apply_default_acl(const char* path, bool no_exec_mask) { +int apply_default_acl(const char* path, + const struct stat* sp, + bool no_exec_mask) { if (path == NULL) { - errno = ENOENT; + errno = EINVAL; + perror("apply_default_acl (args)"); return ACL_ERROR; } @@ -671,9 +676,8 @@ int apply_default_acl(const char* path, bool no_exec_mask) { /* The file descriptor corresponding to "path" */ int fd = 0; - /* Split "path" into base/dirname parts to be used with openat(). - * We duplicate the strings involved because dirname/basename mangle - * their arguments. + /* Get the parent directory of "path" with dirname(), which happens + * to murder its argument and necessitates a path_copy. */ char* path_copy = strdup(path); if (path_copy == NULL) { @@ -682,8 +686,8 @@ int apply_default_acl(const char* path, bool no_exec_mask) { } char* parent = dirname(path_copy); - fd = open(path, O_NOFOLLOW); - if (fd == -1) { + fd = safe_open(path, O_NOFOLLOW); + if (fd == OPEN_ERROR) { if (errno == ELOOP) { result = ACL_FAILURE; /* hit a symlink */ goto cleanup; @@ -702,27 +706,42 @@ int apply_default_acl(const char* path, bool no_exec_mask) { * race condition here, but the window is as small as possible * between when we open the file descriptor (look above) and when we * fstat it. + * + * Note: we only need to call fstat ourselves if we weren't passed a + * valid pointer to a stat structure (nftw does that). */ - if (!is_hardlink_safe(fd)) { - result = ACL_FAILURE; - goto cleanup; + if (sp == NULL) { + struct stat s; + if (fstat(fd, &s) == STAT_ERROR) { + perror("apply_default_acl (fstat)"); + goto cleanup; + } + + sp = &s; } - if (!is_regular_file(fd) && !is_directory(fd)) { - result = ACL_FAILURE; - goto cleanup; + if (!S_ISDIR(sp->st_mode)) { + /* If it's not a directory, make sure it's a regular, + non-hard-linked file. */ + if (!S_ISREG(sp->st_mode) || sp->st_nlink != 1) { + result = ACL_FAILURE; + goto cleanup; + } } + /* Default to not masking the exec bit; i.e. applying the default ACL literally. If --no-exec-mask was not specified, then we try - to "guess" whether or not to mask the exec bit. */ + to "guess" whether or not to mask the exec bit. This behavior + is modeled after the capital 'X' perms of setfacl. */ bool allow_exec = true; if (!no_exec_mask) { - int ace_result = any_can_execute_or_dir(fd); + /* Never mask the execute bit on directories. */ + int ace_result = any_can_execute(fd,sp) || S_ISDIR(sp->st_mode); if (ace_result == ACL_ERROR) { - perror("apply_default_acl (any_can_execute_or_dir)"); + perror("apply_default_acl (any_can_execute)"); result = ACL_ERROR; goto cleanup; } @@ -753,8 +772,13 @@ int apply_default_acl(const char* path, bool no_exec_mask) { goto cleanup; } - /* If it's a directory, inherit the parent's default. */ - if (assign_default_acl(path, defacl) == ACL_ERROR) { + /* If it's a directory, inherit the parent's default. We sure hope + * that "path" still points to the same thing that "fd" and this + * "sp" describe. If not, we may wind up trying to set a default ACL + * on a file, and this will throw an error. I guess that's what we + * want to do? + */ + if (S_ISDIR(sp->st_mode) && assign_default_acl(path, defacl) == ACL_ERROR) { perror("apply_default_acl (assign_default_acl)"); result = ACL_ERROR; goto cleanup; @@ -849,7 +873,7 @@ int apply_default_acl(const char* path, bool no_exec_mask) { if (defacl != (acl_t)NULL) { acl_free(defacl); } - if (fd >= 0 && close(fd) == -1) { + if (fd >= 0 && close(fd) == CLOSE_ERROR) { perror("apply_default_acl (close)"); result = ACL_ERROR; } @@ -891,11 +915,11 @@ void usage(const char* program_name) { * */ int apply_default_acl_nftw(const char *target, - const struct stat *s, + const struct stat *sp, int info, struct FTW *ftw) { - if (apply_default_acl(target, false)) { + if (apply_default_acl(target, sp, false)) { return FTW_CONTINUE; } else { @@ -913,11 +937,11 @@ int apply_default_acl_nftw(const char *target, * */ int apply_default_acl_nftw_x(const char *target, - const struct stat *s, + const struct stat *sp, int info, struct FTW *ftw) { - if (apply_default_acl(target, true)) { + if (apply_default_acl(target, sp, true)) { return FTW_CONTINUE; } else { @@ -952,11 +976,6 @@ int apply_default_acl_nftw_x(const char *target, * we still return @c false. */ bool apply_default_acl_recursive(const char *target, bool no_exec_mask) { - - if (!is_path_directory(target)) { - return apply_default_acl(target, no_exec_mask); - } - int max_levels = 256; int flags = FTW_PHYS; /* Don't follow links. */ @@ -975,11 +994,11 @@ bool apply_default_acl_recursive(const char *target, bool no_exec_mask) { return true; } - /* nftw will return -1 on error, or if the supplied function + /* nftw will return NFTW_ERROR on error, or if the supplied function * (apply_default_acl_nftw) returns a non-zero result, nftw will * return that. */ - if (nftw_result == -1) { + if (nftw_result == NFTW_ERROR) { perror("apply_default_acl_recursive (nftw)"); } @@ -1056,7 +1075,7 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[]) { } else { /* It's either a normal file, or we're not operating recursively. */ - reapp_result = apply_default_acl(target, no_exec_mask); + reapp_result = apply_default_acl(target, NULL, no_exec_mask); } if (!reapp_result) {